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COMMENTS

SHERMAN GETS JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO
GO GLOBAL: EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF U.S.
ANTITRUST LAWS ARE EXPANDED
JENNIFER QUINN*

INTRODUCTION

Recently, a number of Japanese manufacturers conspired1 to
artificially raise the price of facsimile paper sold in the United
States.'
The manufacturers accomplished this conspiracy ' by
selling the paper to their distributors contingent upon a restriction
that the distributors charge an exaggerated price for the paper.'
The manufacturers committed these acts under the assumption
that they were beyond the jurisdictional reach of United States
antitrust laws' because they conducted all of their illegal acts in
Japan.6
Companies operating within the United States are subject to
strict antitrust laws prohibiting the type of actions these Japanese

* J.D. Candidate, June 1999.
1. John Gibeaut, Sherman Goes Abroad: Landmark Decision OKs
InternationalAntitrust Prosecution, A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 42. Two of the
Japanese companies charged with the conspiracy pleaded guilty. Id.
2. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997).
3. Antitrust laws prohibit price fixing whether the actor intended the
result to raise, depress, fix, or stabilize the price of the good being
manipulated. LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D

§ 4:11, at 4-21 (3d ed. 1996).
4. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 2. The distributors consisted of independent
firms also located in Japan with subsidiaries in the United States where the
manufacturers ultimately accomplished the price fix. Id.
5. The pertinent antitrust laws include the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act. Sherman Act §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994); Clayton Act §§ 1-16, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 (1994).

6. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 944 F. Supp. 55, 62 (D. Mass.
1996) (noting that the manufacturers committed the criminal conduct
completely in Japan).
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firms undertook.7 Congress intended these antitrust laws restrict
unfair competition.8 However, American antitrust laws would
actually enable the very conduct Congress intended to prohibit if
these manufacturers were correct in assuming that they were
immune from American laws simply because they conducted their
illegal activities abroad. If courts had accepted this interpretation,
foreign firms would have an unfair advantage over domestic firms.
American antitrust laws would act to constrain domestic firms'
business practices while allowing foreign firms to avoid these
constraints by conducting their business arrangements abroad.
Fortunately, these Japanese manufacturers were mistaken in
their belief that they were beyond the reach of United States'
antitrust laws. It has been over fifty years since the Second
Circuit 9 determined that United States antitrust laws can, in
certain circumstances, apply to wholly extraterritorial" conduct."
Although the circumstances set forth above describe the first
"criminal" antitrust prosecution based on wholly extraterritorial
conduct;" the handling of criminal prosecutions
should be the
13
same as that of "civil" antitrust prosecutions.
This Comment will discuss why courts should give criminal
antitrust prosecutions the same extraterritorial reach as that
historically given civil antitrust cases. Part I discusses the history
of antitrust laws with regard to the role of civil and criminal

7. See generally Sherman Act § 1 (stating that conspiracies in restraint of
trade are illegal).
8. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (3d
Cir. 1979) (concluding that Congress enacted the United States antitrust laws
to protect the free flow of competition); see also U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelinesfor InternationalOperations, 55 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391, at S-3 (Nov. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Antitrust
Enforcement] (explaining that "[t]he U.S. antitrust laws are the legal
embodiment of our nation's commitment to a free market economy").
9. The Supreme Court certified the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to sit
as a court of last resort. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
421 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1994) (granting authority for
the Supreme Court to certify a Circuit Court to sit as a court of last resort
where there is no quorum or in the event of disqualification).
10. Extraterritorial conduct refers to conduct committed "beyond the
physical and juridical boundaries of a particular state or county." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 588 (6th ed. 1990).
11. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 444 (applying United States
antitrust laws where the violator intends his conduct to affect, and where the
conduct actually does affect, the United States).
12. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 2. In Nippon Paper,the court concluded that
a criminal prosecution based on wholly extraterritorial conduct is "uncharted
terrain" without direct authority. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 9. The court also explained that the Sherman Act applies to
wholly extraterritorial conduct in both civil and criminal cases where there is
intent to affect the United States and there is an actual affect in the United
States. Id.
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antitrust actions and sets out the evolution of the extraterritorial
Part II describes the
reach provided civil antitrust actions.
parallelism that exists between civil and criminal antitrust actions
and discusses the different protections provided to defendants in
criminal actions versus civil actions. Part III proposes that case
precedent warrants criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act
against wholly extraterritorial conduct and urges steps that the
government should take to make such enforcement possible.
I.

THE UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS AND THEIR
JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE

Congress designed antitrust laws, whether applied to activities
committed domestically or abroad, to protect the public's welfare. 4
Antitrust laws do this by mandating the most productive use of,
and allocation of, resources." These antitrust laws accomplish this
by protecting free access to America's markets and encouraging
competition. 16 Section A discusses the enforcement of the relevant
antitrust laws. Section B narrates how it became settled law that
United States antitrust laws apply to foreign conduct that is
meant to produce, and does in fact produce, an effect in the United
States.
A. Elements of the Relevant Laws

Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 8 provide the foundation
for both civil and criminal actions alleging antitrust activity. 9
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations
and conspiracies that restrain domestic and/or foreign trade.20
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, whether
attempted or actual and conspiracies to monopolize domestic
and/or foreign trade.2 ' Either the United States attorneys,22 state
14. Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 8, at S-3.
15. Id. at S-5.
16. Department of Justice, An Antitrust Primer for Federal Prosecutors,
Sept. 1994, available in 1994 WL 637072 (F.T.C), at *1 [hereinafter Antitrust
Primer].
17. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 443 (explaining that it is "settled
law" that a state can enforce its laws for conduct committed abroad if the
conduct produces consequences in that state even though the actor is not a
citizen).
18. Sherman Act §§ 1, 2.
19. Nippon Paper, 944 F. Supp. at 64.
20. Sherman Act § 1. Section 1 states that "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
21. Sherman Act § 2. Section 2 states that "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the

several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .. "
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attorney generals,23 or private citizens" may bring civil suits under
the Sherman Act. Congress has limited criminal enforcement of
the Sherman Act to the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). 25
Civil suits brought by either state attorney generals, acting as
26
parens patriae,
or private citizens may result in an award of
treble damages27 plus the cost of bringing the suit, including
reasonable attorney's fees.28 Criminal prosecution of the Sherman
Act can result in a fine up to $10,000,000 for corporations or
$350,000 for individuals; imprisonment for up to three years; or,
both a fine and imprisonment.29 Congress has also provided an
alternative fine of twice the gross pecuniary gain resulting from a
violation of the Sherman Act. °
Although Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that any
restraint of trade 31 is illegal, courts interpret this language to only
apply to "unreasonable" restraints on trade.32 In determining

22. Sherman Act § 4. The United States attorneys must bring actions in
equity to restrain violations of the Sherman Act. Id.
23. Clayton Act § 4c. The Act states in pertinent part:
Any attorney general in the name of a State may bring a civil action...
as parens patriae on behalf of a natural persons residing in such
State... to secure monetary relief.., for injury sustained by such
natural persons to their property by reason of any violation of sections 1
to 7 of this title.
Id. (emphasis added).
24. Clayton Act §§ 4, 15. Section 4 provides that, "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States. . .

."

Clayton Act § 4.

Section 15 provides that, "[a]ny person, firm,

corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive
relief.., against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws ...... Clayton Act § 15.

25. Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 8, at S-3 n.4.
26. Parenspatriae,among other things, "is a concept of standing utilized to
protect those quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of
the people ..." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). It is under
this that the state attorneys general have authority to bring antitrust actions
on behalf of the citizens of their state. Clayton Act § 15c.
27. Treble damages equal three times the damages sustained as a result of
the antitrust violation. Clayton Act § 4; Clayton Act § 4c.
28. Clayton Act § 4; Clayton Act § 4c.
29. Sherman Act §§ 1, 2.
30. Antitrust Primer,supra note 16, at *2.
31. See Sherman Act § 1 (declaring that "[e]very contract, combination...
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal").
32. See United States v. All Star Indus., 962 F.2d 465, 468-69 (5th Cir.
1992) (explaining that the Supreme Court has always interpreted the
language as prohibiting only unreasonable restraints on trade); Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(holding that it is only unreasonable restraints on trade that the laws
prohibit). See also Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 8, at S-6 (explaining that
if the courts did not only prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade then the
laws would require the courts to consider almost all productive activity illegal
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whether a particular action violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act
by causing an "unreasonable" restraint on trade, the courts follow
two rules.3" The first rule, termed the per se rule,34 does not
require conclusive evidence of motive or actual effect on United
States' trade or commerce." 5 This rule applies to activities that
courts have found "so egregiously anticompetitive 'that they are
conclusively presumed illegal without further examination.... . 6
Activities consistently considered per se illegal include: price fixing
agreements; bid rigging; allocation of customers or territories; and
agreements to boycott.3 7 Once a court establishes a per se violation
of the Sherman Act,' a defendant may not offer evidence to rebut

because it usually involves cooperation between parties).
33. See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)
(noting that the rule of reason ordinarily applies when a court decides whether
conduct violates the antitrust laws, but that the per se rule is appropriate
where conduct is egregiously anticompetitive); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979) (concluding that certain
conduct that is clearly anticompetitive is presumed to be illegal under the per
se rule and that it does not need to be examined under the typical rule of
reason test applied in antitrust cases); All Star, 962 F.2d. at 469 (explaining
that courts only consider acts as "per se" illegal when they blatantly violate
the antitrust laws while the courts analyze all other conduct on a "case-bycase" basis under the rule of reason to determine whether it violates the
antitrust laws).
34. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940)
(announcing the term "unlawful per se" to describe the idea that price fixing
agreements implicitly violate the Sherman Act).
35. Russ & Segalla, supra note 3, § 4:9, at 4-18.
36. All Star, 962 F.2d at 469. The court went on to explain that the policy
behind the per se rule is to withdraw the courts from the accounting function
that is necessary for a determination of whether particularly blatant
anticompetitive conduct actually unreasonably restrains commerce in the
industry involved. Id. at 469 n.7. See Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 8, at
S-6 (explaining that the DOJ considers blatant restraints on trade that lack
any redeeming quality as per se illegal without further review).
37. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 427 (noting that some conduct is
unlawful no matter how beneficial it may be, including territory allotment and
price fixing); All Star, 962 F.2d at 469 (deciding that agreements to fix prices
are among the activities considered as per se illegal); Antitrust Enforcement,
supra note 8, at S-6 (providing price fixing and big rigging as examples of per
se illegal conduct); Russ & Segalla, supra note 3, § 4:9, at 4-18 (including price
fixing, bid rigging, allocation of territory and customers, and agreements to
boycott as per se illegal activities); Antitrust Primer, supra note 16, at *3
(concluding that price fixing, bid rigging, and allocation of territory and
customers is per se illegal).
38. The typical per se illegal activities, price fixing, bid rigging, and
customer or market allocation are more likely to occur when a particular set of
conditions are present. Antitrust Primer, supra note 16, at *5. The conditions
that lead to this type of activity include a small number of sellers, a small
number of buyers, lack of substitutes for the goods sold, and situations where
the goods are so standardized there is no margin for diversification. Id. at *56.
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the presumption of illegality.39 The DOJ usually confines criminal
prosecution of the Sherman Act to those activities that are per se
illegal.4 °
The second rule courts utilize in determining whether conduct
places an "unreasonable" restraint on trade is the "rule of
reason." 4' The rule of reason applies to activities that courts have
not classified as per se illegal. 2 This test permits a court to
determine whether a restrictive activity imposes an unreasonable
restraint on trade only after the court has weighed all the relevant
factors.43 One relevant factor in determining whether certain
activities unreasonably restrain trade is whether those activities
would increase market productivity, thereby actually creating a
more competitive marketplace.44 Another factor is whether the
benefits such activity may produce actually exceed the risk of
harm from the corresponding restraint of trade.4
In order to successfully prosecute an action under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, the prosecution or plaintiff must prove three
elements: (1) that the defendant had the specific intent to
monopolize; (2) that the defendant succeeded in, or there is a
dangerous probability that the defendant will succeed in,
achieving a monopoly; and (3) that the defendant has monopolistic
power in the relevant market. 46 However, some respected legal
scholars, including Judge Learned Hand, have claimed that it is
"nonsense" to interpret Section 2 of the Sherman Act as requiring
any "specific" intent. 7 The purposes of Section 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act is one and the same, the protection of competition in
United States' markets. 8
B. Evolution of Sherman's Jurisdiction
Section 1 of the Sherman Act expressly prohibits "every
contract, combination,... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or

39. Id. at *3.
40. Id.; Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 8, at S-6.
41. All Star, 962 F.2d at 469.

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 8, at S-6. Activities that the courts
typically analyze under the rule of reason analysis include joint ventures,
vertical distribution arrangements (ex: from parts to manufacturer to the

market), and intellectual property licensing arrangements (ex: patents,
licenses, etc.). Id.
45. Id at S-7.
46. Id.; Antitrust Primer,supra note 16, at *7-8.
47. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 432. Judge Learned Hand stated
that "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing." Id.

48. See id. at 428 (explaining that the offensive nature of the violations of
Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act is the restriction of free competition to
United States' commerce).
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commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."49
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolies, attempted
monopolies, or conspiracies to monopolize "any part of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.""
This "potentially far-reaching language" raises the loaded question
of exactly how far the legislature intended the Sherman Act's
jurisdictional reach to extend.9" By not expressly confining the
Sherman Act's reach, Congress implicitly left it up to the courts to
decide its scope.52 The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
taken abroad in
the Sherman Act's jurisdiction over actions
53
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.
In American Banana, the defendant conspired with the Costa
Rican Government to drive the plaintiff out of business. 4 The
Court stated that the laws of the nation in which the violator
committed the act must determine the lawfulness of the act." The
Court went on to hold that the Costa Rican government took
possession of the plaintiffs land and supplies through the use of
its sovereign power and that any interference with that action
would be contrary to the notion of the "comity of nations."56 The
Court held that the plaintiffs could not bring civil actions under

49. Sherman Act § 1.
50. Sherman Act § 2.
51. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d
Cir. 1979) (debating whether the Sherman Act applied to activities committed
in a foreign country by an American corporation). See generally Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(explaining the relevance of "legislative jurisdiction" in determining the
extraterritorial reach of a statute stemming from Congress' broad power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"). The United States Constitution
grants Congress the very broad power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes...." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1291 (determining that neither the
act nor its legislative history gave the courts any guidance as to the
jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that the Sherman Act's only

limit is the Commerce Clause, which governs all legislation enacted by
Congress).
53. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).

54. Id. at 355. The Costa Rican army seized the plaintiffs plantation and
supplies and forced the stoppage of construction on the plaintiffs railway
being built to get his harvest to the American market. Id. The defendant,
who had a monopoly on the banana market, insisted that this restrictive
activity take place. Id. at 354-55.
55. Id. at 356.
56. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356-57. See generally Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (defining comity as "the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of

another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws").

The John MarshallLaw Review

[32:141

the Sherman Act based on wholly extraterritorial conduct."
Following a slow erosion of the Court's holding in American
58
Banana,
the Second Circuit in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America 9 attacked this historically narrow interpretation. 6 The
court afforded extraterritorial reach to the Sherman Act if a
violator intended to effect commerce in the United States, provided
that the alleged conduct actually had an effect61 upon commerce.62
Courts refer to this analysis as the "effects test."63
Although the effects test remained the integral factor in the
analysis of whether the Sherman Act has extraterritorial reach,
the court in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America 64 expanded
the analysis by requiring an inquiry into comity 5 considerations.66
57. American Banana,213 U.S. at 355-56.

58. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927)
(concluding that in the circumstances where courts have found that the
Sherman Act has jurisdiction over conspiratorial conduct it is not affected
even though the actors were facilitated by legislation of a foreign nation).
59. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
60. See id. at 443 (holding that the Sherman Act has extraterritorial
jurisdiction over conduct that has consequences within the United States).
61. Cf. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a
(1994) (establishing that with regard to United States' "export" trade, the
effect on commerce must be "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable"
in order for the Sherman Act to apply to activities involving trade with foreign
nations).
62. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 444. Drawing from the decision of
American Banana, the court noted that it interpreted Congress' mandate to
enforce the antitrust laws as only applying to conduct which effects United
States' commerce. Id. at 443. See also American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357
(determining that statutory language having "universal scope" will be
understood to apply only to those subject to the statute's jurisdiction, not to
just anyone who authorities have detained and brought before the court).
After the court achieves jurisdiction and once the prosecutor/plaintiff proves
the intent to affect United States commerce, the burden shifts to the
defendant to establish that there was no actual effect on the commerce.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 445. The basis for this shift in the burden
of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant is that the courts assume that any
restriction of the factors that determine prices will inevitably have some effect
on the price. Id.
63. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1291 (noting that the "effects test"
had gained support from the Supreme Court); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing the "effects test" in
respect to comity considerations).
64. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
65. It is important to distinguish between the "comity of courts" and
"prescriptive comity." Hartford, 509 U.S. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
"comity of courts" refers to a judge's power to deny jurisdiction where there
may be a more appropriate court in which to hear the suit; "prescriptive
comity" refers to the respect nations afford each other with regard to limiting
the extraterritorial reach of their laws where appropriate. Id.
66. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615. The court determined that in order to be
complete, the "effects test" must be coupled with a determination of the
relevant foreign interests. Id. at 611. The court reasoned that anytime there
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The court formulated a "tripartite analysis" which a court was to
apply when assessing whether it had subject matter jurisdiction67
to enforce extraterritorial violations of the Sherman Act.6 This
analysis required that a court take into account comity
considerations prior to determining whether the court has subject
matter jurisdiction.69
The court in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,0 like
the court in Timberlane,71 chose to include comity considerations in
its analysis of whether a court should exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 2 However, unlike the court in Timberlane,73 the court
in Mannington kept the comity analysis 7 separate from the issue
is a need to utilize the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act, the conduct
the parties are litigating will have also affected the trade and commerce of a
foreign nation. Id. The court went on to explain that there will be times when
the domestic interests will not be strong enough to overcome the interests of
the foreign nation and in such a case the court should not grant jurisdiction.
Id. at 609.
67. Subject matter jurisdiction is the "court's power to hear and determine
cases of the general class or category to which proceedings in question belong;
the power to deal with the general subject involved in the action." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (6th ed. 1990).
68. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613. The first factor a court must consider
when determining whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a Sherman
Act claim is whether the activity had an intended or actual effect on the
commerce of the United States. Id. The second factor a court must consider is
whether the effect actually harmed the plaintiff in a way in which the courts
would recognize a compensable injury. Id. Finally, the third factor is whether
comity considerations counsel against the application of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. Some elements a court must weigh when determining the
effect of comity include:
[t]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or
allegiance of the parties and the locations or principle places of
businesses or corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of
effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the
extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance
to the violations charged on conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614.
69. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
70. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
71. See supra notes 66, 68 and accompanying text.
72. ManningtonMills, 595 F.2d at 1294.
73. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
74. The factors the court in Mannington Mills proposed that courts should
consider when determining the effect of comity factors include:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here
compared to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
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of whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction. 5 Once the
court found that subject matter jurisdiction existed, it then
analyzed comity considerations to see if the court should exercise
its jurisdiction."6
These two divergent views77 remained in effect until the
Supreme Court, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,
addressed the issue of how comity considerations should affect the
exercise of jurisdiction.8 In Hartford, the Court found that the
foreign defendants79 conspired to effect, and actually did affect,
commerce in the United States.80 The Court held that the Sherman
Act therefore applied and that it was proper to consider comity
factors only after determining whether the court had subject
matter jurisdiction.81 Although the Hartford court found that the
only relevant comity factor was whether "there is in fact a true
conflict between domestic and foreign law.
,,,
2the court failed to
discuss whether other comity factors" would ever be sufficient
enough for any court to decline the exercise of its jurisdiction."
Thus, a court may consider comity in its analysis of whether

foreseeability;

6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercised
jurisdiction and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of
being forced to perform and act illegal in either country or be -under

conflicting requirements by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if
made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances;

10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the
issue.
Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98.

75. Id. at 1294.
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 66, 68, 69, 74-76 and accompanying text.

78. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
79. The defendants the court in Hartford spoke of were London based
reinsurance companies. Id. at 796.
80. See id. (discussing that the defendants had effected the United States
insurance market).
81. Id. at 798 n.24. This decision effectively overruled the analysis of the
court in Timberlane that required the consideration of comity factors in

determining whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction in the first
place. See id. (adopting the Mannington approach of considering comity
factors after jurisdiction is established and distinguishing its analysis from
that in Timberlane).
82. Hartford,509 U.S. at 798.

83. See supra notes 68, 74.
84. See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 798 (explaining that it is not necessary to

discuss the issue of whether comity factors could ever counsel against the
exercise of jurisdiction because the factors would not counsel against it under
the current circumstances).
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it should exercise its jurisdiction."" However, comity does not
require the abstention from the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction merely because a foreign nation could also regulate
the actor's conduct. 6
When courts exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction, two defenses frequently arise: the "act of state"
doctrine87 and the doctrine of "sovereign compulsion. " '
89
The Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez
originally
articulated the act of state doctrine as the principle that "[e]very
sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment of the acts of the government of another, done within its
own territory."90 Before a court will accept the defense of the act of
state doctrine, the court must consider the particular
characteristics of the anticompetitive activity itself; its effect on
the parties involved in the litigation; and the magnitude of the role
the foreign nation played.91 The Supreme Court in Hartford Fire
92
Insurance Co. v. California,
however, limited the scope of the act
of state doctrine when it held that "even where the foreign state
has a strong policy to permit or encourage ... conduct ... [nlo
conflict exists . . . 'where a person subject to regulations by two
states can comply with the laws of both.' 93
The defense of sovereign compulsion protects actors from
85. Id. at 798 n.24; Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1296.
86. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 799; Mannington, 595 F.2d at 1302 (Adams, J.,
concurring).
87. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1292 (concluding that the defendant
relied heavily on the act of state doctrine as a defense to the claims against
him); Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 607 (explaining why the court rejected the
defendant's assertion of an act of state defense); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v.
Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (discussing the
defendants motion to dismiss brought on the grounds of the act of state
doctrine).
88. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293 (discussing the similarity in
the defenses of sovereign compulsion and the act of state doctrine);
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 606 (determining that the assertion of sovereign
compulsion is another recognized defense to the extraterritorial reach of the
Sherman Act).

89. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
90. Id. at 252.
91. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293. See also Timberlane, 549 F.2d at
606 (concluding that neither government approval or government involvement
alone can sustain the defense of the act of state doctrine). The court also
concluded that even if ordinarily the defendant could claim the act of state
doctrine as a defense under particular circumstances, the weaker the foreign
relation issues are, the less likely a court will be to deny extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Id. at 607. In addition, the court determined that courts do not
consider a court judgment an act of state because it represents private
interests that the parties merely litigated before the court and not the public
interests of the foreign nation. Id. at 607-08.

92. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
93. Id. at 799.
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liability where a sovereign compelled their anticompetitive
activities. 9 The actor claiming the defense must show that the
sovereign "mandated"9" conduct that was an "integral"96 part of the
anticompetitive activity.97 This means that the actor cannot assert
the defense of sovereign compulsion if he or she could have refused
to obey the demands of the sovereign.98
II. CIVIL VERSUS

CRIMINAL: IS THERE REALLY A DISTINCTION?

Because the Sherman Act does not expressly state the
jurisdictional scope Congress intended it to have, 99 courts have
determined that Congress relied on its broad power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations. . ."0 when enacting the general
language of this Act.1 1 Courts are not to give effect to general
words, such as those in the Sherman Act; 2 however, without
giving regard to the limitations the "Conflict of Laws" theory0 "
imposes.0 In Aluminum Co. of America, 0° after considering the

94. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293; Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 606. The
sovereign compulsion defense treats the actor's conduct as though the state
committed the act itself. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 606.
95. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293-94 (holding that the defense
requires more than the "mere approval" of the foreign sovereign).
96. See id. at 1293 (deciding that the "foreign decree" must have been a
"basic and fundamental" aspect of the challenged activity).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d
Cir. 1979).
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
101. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th
Cir. 1976). See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690, 704 (1962) (upholding Congress' power to regulate trade with foreign
nations by applying the Sherman Act to conduct occurring primarily in
Canada); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 579 n.7 (1953) (determining that
courts must give effect to legislation that Congress intended to regulate
commerce with foreign nations).
102. The general words referred to include those in section one of the
Sherman Act, stating that "[e]very contract... is declared to be illegal," and
those in section two stating that "[e]very person who shall monopolize ...shall
be deemed guilty of a felony ... ." Sherman Act §§ 1, 2.
103. When there is an "[i]nconsistency or difference between the laws of
different states or countries, arising in the case of persons who have acquired
rights, incurred obligations, injuries or damages, or made contracts, within the
territory of two or more jurisdictions . . .," the courts must either reconcile the
laws, or select between the two, and then the court must decide "the degree of
force to be accorded the law of another jurisdiction .... BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 299-300 (6th ed. 1990).
104. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884 (5th Cir.
1982); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945).
105. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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limitations the "Conflict of Laws" placed on Congress, the court
found that the Sherman Act's broad language did give
extraterritorial jurisdiction to the courts where a violator intended
to effect, and did effect, United States' commerce. '
Once the courts decide that Congress has addressed the
"Conflict of Laws" problem, courts are bound to carry out the
legislation." '
Therefore, in order to protect United States'
commerce, courts must give the extraterritorial reach Congress
mandated to the United States' antitrust laws."0 ' In order to
accomplish this, the Sherman Act must be able to reach foreign
defendants and wholly extraterritorial anticompetitive conduct.' 9
Until the First Circuit afforded extraterritorial reach to the
Sherman Act's jurisdiction in a criminal suit in March of 1997, the
courts had only utilized the Sherman Act's extraterritorial reach
in civil settings."' This Part addresses whether the Sherman Act's
extraterritorial jurisdiction should apply in criminal antitrust
prosecutions. Section A explains the parallelism between criminal
and civil enforcement of the Sherman Act. Section B explains the
varying legal protections afforded a defendant in an antitrust suit.
Section C explains why criminal suits dealing with foreign
defendants and extraterritorial conduct have been lacking in the
past.
A. CongressionalPlan to Provide and Promote ParallelRemedies
Many statutes that regulate a large area of activity, such as
antitrust laws, have incorporated a private cause of action in the
legislation creating "private attorneys general""' to help deter
illegal conduct whenever government assets are ineffectual."2
United States' antitrust laws utilize both criminal and civil
remedies to achieve their objectives." 3 Civil remedies supplement
106. Id. at 443.
107. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 579 n.7.

108. Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 8, at S-3.
109. Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 8, at S-3.
110. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997)

(determining that whether the Sherman Act had extraterritorial reach in a
criminal antitrust prosecution was an unanswered question prior to this case).

111. See Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 596 F. Supp. 416, 419
(D.D.C. 1984) (discussing how private parties acting as "private attorneys
general" can enforce public policy by bringing actions under the United States'

antitrust laws).
112. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 151
(1987) (allowing private parties to act as "private attorneys general" to help

enforce the United States' antitrust laws is necessary because the government
lacks the resources necessary for effective enforcement).
113. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332
F.2d 346, 350 (3d Cir. 1964). Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act do not
create civil obligations, they articulate activities that, if committed, render the
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criminal remedies by providing the government with additional
means to combat actions taken in violation of antitrust laws.
Specifically, the public, acting as "private attorneys general," may
go after anticompetitive behavior, increasing the likelihood of
punishment, which then intensifies the deterrent effect of
antitrust laws.
1. CongressionalIntent to Utilize Private and Public Actions in
Antitrust Enforcement
The use of "private attorneys general" to enforce antitrust
laws was an essential element in Congress' strategy to eliminate
anticompetitive behavior.'
Congress aspired to provide a
framework allowing private suits to enforce antitrust laws so
effectively that the majority of public actions would not be
imperative." ' Additionally, Congress hoped that the cumulative
effect of both private and public suits would help deter
anticompetitive behavior. 6
2. Promotion of the Use of Civil Actions to PunishAnticompetitive
Behavior
Both Congress and the courts have promoted the use of civil
suits to punish activity that violates antitrust laws. Congress
accomplished its goal of civil suits as a punishment through
statutory enactments. The courts have further encouraged the use
of civil suits as a punishment by often holding that a defendants'
rights to certain common law defenses are waived in such suits.

actor criminally culpable.

Indusustrial Inv., 671 F.2d at

891.

See also

Sherman Act §§ 1, 2 (providing felony punishments for the violation thereof).
However, sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act provide for civil remedies where

a party has violated an antitrust law. See Clayton Act §§ 4, 16 (providing
treble damages and injunctive relief in civil actions); see also California v.

American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990) (concluding that section 16 of
the Clayton Act was partly enacted to help execute the antitrust laws); New

Jersey Wood, 332 F.2d at 350 (explaining that section 4 of the Clayton Act
enables businesses to work with the government in enforcing the antitrust
laws and increases the government's arsenal of weapons for its attack on

violators by providing more private remedies, thus, saving the government the
burden of litigating these suits itself).
114. See American Stores, 495 U.S. at 284 (discussing Congress' intent to
utilize private actions to protect competition); Chrysler, 596 F. Supp. at 418-19
(explaining that private actions are a necessary tool to guarantee the

effectiveness of the United States' antitrust laws).
115. See New Jersey Wood, 332 F.2d at 350 (expressing Congress' desire for
private civil suits to make public actions unnecessary). Congress hoped to
save the government time and money by placing part of the weight of

enforcement on the general public. Id. at 350 n.4.
116. See id. at 352 (discussing Congress' desire for a "cumulative remedy" for
anticompetitive behavior).
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Congressional Promotion of Private Civil Actions

Congress included several benefits in its antitrust legislation
to encourage private citizens to sue violators of antitrust laws." 7
In its desire to make private suits an essential element in
enforcing antitrust laws, the possibility of receiving treble
damages is the primary stimulus."" The lure of treble damages
serves the purpose of enforcing antitrust laws by encouraging
private citizens to bring suit. 1 9
Treble damage awards, however, have a much broader
purpose than just promoting private civil suits. That purpose is to
punish those who commit acts declared illegal under the antitrust
laws.12 The treble damage remedy enables the government
to use
12 1
private citizens to "prosecute, sue, and shun criminals." '
Treble

damages

serve

a

dual purpose. 2

First, they

117. See American Stores, 495 U.S. at 284 (holding that if a private citizen
brought suit at the same time a government action was pending, the court
would toll the statute of limitations so that the plaintiff could wait and use a
successful judgment in a government action as prima facie evidence in the
private civil suit); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 266
(1972) (determining that Congress granted actions to private citizens under
the antitrust laws regardless of the amount in controversy). The court in
Standard Oil went on to explain that Congress also made provisions for the
receipt of attorneys fees in a successful antitrust action brought by "private
attorneys general." Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 266. See also Clayton Act § 4
(providing for the recoupment of attorneys fees in successful private civil
actions).
118. See Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 262, 275 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(concluding that Congress hoped treble damage awards would encourage
private individuals to bring suits on behalf of the general public as "private
attorneys general" in order to save the government time and money); Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 945 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (concluding that treble damages are the "centerpiece" of Congress' plan
to encourage private actions).
119. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 133
(1969) (determining that the purpose of giving private parties treble damages
is in part to encourage the enforcement of antitrust laws). The court then
concluded that treble actions serve the public interest by "pry[ing] open to
competition a market that has been closed by defendants' illegal restraints."
Id. (quoting N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361, 401 (1906)).
120. See Industrial Inv., 671 F.2d at 891 (concluding that treble damages are
meant in part to penalize offenders of the antitrust laws); County of Orange v.
Sullivan Highway Prod., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 643, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(determining that treble damage actions play a penal role in the statutory
scheme set up for the enforcement of Antitrust laws).
121. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve Law Objectives: Understandingand Transcending the Criminal-Civil
Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1347 (1991). The author further
explained that statutes creating "private attorneys general" essentially
convert the plaintiffs "into bounty hunters.., paid handsomely, out of the
offenders' pockets, to sue those who have..." committed the illegal acts. Id.
122. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977); Mid-West Paper
Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 583 (3d Cir. 1979).
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compensate the victims of anticompetitive conduct. 128 Second, they
deter violators by increasing the likelihood of a suit, which may
deprive them threefold of "the fruits of their illegality."'24
b.

Judicial Promotion of Private Civil Actions

Congress has not been alone in promoting the use of civil
actions to deter anticompetitive activity. The courts, too, have
seen the need for private civil actions; and have in certain
instances even held that a defendant does not have a right to
several common law defenses otherwise available.
First, the court in IndustrialInvestment Development Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co.'25 found that the common law doctrine of forum non
127
conveniens... is not applicable in United States' antitrust suits.
The court reasoned that because of the penal nature of the treble
action, 128 foreign courts are not an appropriate forum.1 2'9 The
defendants in Mitsui8 0 moved to have the suit dismissed on the
3
ground of forum non conveniens.1
' The defendants believed that
because all of the activities alleged had taken place in Indonesia,
Indonesia would be a more suitable forum.12 The court stated that
a dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens would inhibit
the Sherman Act's extraterritorial reach; therefore, the court
found that "antitrust cases cannot be dismissed33 on the ground that
a foreign country is a more convenient forum."

123. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746; Mid-West, 596 F.2d at 583.
124. Id.
125. 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982).
126. Forum non conveniens is a "[t]erm refer[ring] to [the] discretionary
power of the court[s] to decline jurisdiction when convenience of parties and
ends of justice would be better served if action[s] were brought and tried in
another forum." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990).
127. Industrial Inv., 671 F.2d at 890.
128. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
penal nature of treble actions.
129. Industrial Inv., 671 F.2d at 891. The court explained that it is a "wellestablished principle of international law that the courts of no country execute
the penal laws of another." Id. See also Clayton Act § 12 (providing that
antitrust actions against corporations may be brought in any district in which
the corporation conducts business). The court in Industrial Investment,
further explained that to allow the defendants to claim the defense of forum
non conveniens would unnecessarily protract the litigation because antitrust
actions usually involve corporations that do business nationwide or have
offices and subsidiaries all over the world. IndustrialInv., 671 F.2d at 890.
130. The defendants were Mitsui & Co., a Japanese company, its American
subsidiary, Mitsui & Co. (USA), and P.T. Telaga Mas Kalimantan Co., an
Indonesian company. IndustrialInv., 671 F.2d at 881.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 891.
133. Id. The court explained that the defendants would have been using the
doctrine to usurp the constitutionally granted extraterritorial jurisdiction of
United States antitrust laws. Id.

1998]

Sherman Goes Global

Second, courts have found that the common law defense of in
35
pari delicto3 4 is not a recognized defense in antitrust actions.
The courts reasoned that the public policy behind the enforcement
of the antitrust laws and the "ever present threat" of private
actions, acting as a deterrent to anticompetitive behavior, are
more important than a defendant's claim that the plaintiff himself
has broken the antitrust laws.136 This takes into account the
theory that the plaintiff is not suing simply for his own injuries,
but also as a public representative through his capacity as a
"private attorney general."137
Third, courts have rejected the "pass-on" defense that the
defendant's acts did not actually injure the plaintiff because the
plaintiff passed on his economic injury to his customers.'38 Courts
134. In pari delicto means "equal fault; equally culpable or criminal; in a
case of equal fault or guilt." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990).

135. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
138 (1968) (finding that in pari delicto is not a defense to antitrust claims);
Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276, 278 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that
the courts do not recognize the common law defense of in pari delicto as a

defense in antitrust actions); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 596 F.
Supp. 416, 418 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that because private antitrust suits
"serve important public purposes the courts do not recognize the common law
defense of in pari delicto in antitrust cases").
136. See Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 139 (determining that "the antitrust laws
are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present
threat" even if the plaintiff is somewhat guilty himself because of the
"overriding public policy in favor of competition"); Chrysler, 596 F. Supp. at
419 (finding that a defendant's "claim that the plaintiff has himself violated
the law himself cannot be allowed to "overshadow plaintiffs cause of action
and the potential vindication of the public interest"). Limited circumstances
exist where the defense of in pari delicto may bar a plaintiff from recovering.
Javelin, 546 F.2d at 279. Those limited circumstances are when the plaintiff
himself helped form the conspiracy and the plaintiff is of at least equal fault
with the defendant. Id. In these circumstances, the burden of proof to show
that the defense of in pari delicto is applicable shifts to the defendant. Id.
137. Javelin, 546 F.2d at 280.
138. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977) (accepting that
defendants may not use the "pass-on theory" as a defense in an antitrust
action); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494
(1968) (denying the defendant the opportunity to introduce evidence that the
plaintiff passed-on his injury to indirect purchasers). One reason for the
rejection of the pass-on defense is that the defense would unnecessarily
complicate the treble action. Hanover, 392 U.S. at 492. The acceptance of the
pass-on defense would require the courts to trace the effects of the overcharge
to the indirect purchasers. Id. at 493. The defendant may still assert the
pass-on defense, however, when there is a fixed quantity, cost plus contract,
between a direct purchaser and his clients because the contract itself would
show who absorbed the cost of the artificially inflated price without forcing the
court to trace the transaction from beginning to end. Mid-West Paper Prod.
Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 577 (3d Cir. 1979). This type of
contract guarantees that the indirect purchaser actually absorbs the whole
overcharge. Id. A second reason for not allowing the pass-on defense is to
insure that the courts punish antitrust violators for their conduct. Hanover,
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have rejected the pass-on defense because by allowing a direct
purchaser, who may or may not pass-on an overcharge to his
customers, to sue the antitrust violators ensures the full recovery
of the overcharge instead of only allowing recovery in smaller
increments by the customers. 139 The derivative effect of not
allowing the pass-on defense is that this policy also bars the
indirect purchaser from recovering damages from the original
antitrust violator. 4 ° However, because the private civil suit is
such an important element in the enforcement of the antitrust
laws, courts continue to allow indirect purchasers to bring actions
requesting injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act. 141
B. ProtectionsProvided by Public Actions Versus Private Actions
By granting extraterritorial jurisdiction to the Sherman Act,
courts have gained a wide range of powers over those individuals
who violate antitrust laws. However, numerous limits exist on the
courts' powers in these areas.
1.

Comity Factors

Before a court exercises jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
or foreign conduct, the court must consider the impact such a
decision will have on foreign nations.4 2
One reason a court

394 U.S. at 494. The direct purchaser has the highest incentive to sue because

he carries the full burden of the original overcharge.

Id. If the direct

purchaser does pass-on the overcharge to the indirect purchasers, it only
affects the indirect purchasers by a small percentage of the full overcharge,
therefore, they have less incentive to sue. Id.

139. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735.
140. Id. at 747. The same reasoning applies here as it does to the use of the
pass-on defense. The courts want to ensure effective enforcement of the
antitrust laws, so they concentrate on recovery through the direct purchasers.

Id. at 735. Direct purchasers initially absorb the complete impact of the
artificial prices while indirect purchasers absorb only a portion of the
overcharge. Id. at 736. Therefore, direct purchasers are more likely to sue

than indirect purchasers are because they have a greater incentive to sue;
they will receive a higher damage reward if the suit is successful. Id. The
courts cannot allow both indirect and direct purchasers to sue because it
would result in "duplicative recoveries." Id. at 730.
141. Mid-West, 596 F.2d at 594. The private individual's right to bring an

action for injunctive relief does not affect the courts main concern in Hanover
that the pass-on defense would cripple the enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 592. The use of injunctive relief does not deny the direct purchaser of
his right to sue for treble damages, nor does it subject the violator to multiple
liability. Id.
142. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993)

(finding that the only comity factor that would keep the court from exercising
its jurisdiction in this case was a "true conflict between the applicable
domestic and foreign laws"); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595

F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the court's analysis of whether to
exercise jurisdiction should include comity factors); Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
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considers comity factors when deciding whether to exercise
jurisdiction is the danger of violating our Nation's system of
separation of powers by imposing upon the executive branch's
authority to manage foreign affairs.'43 Whenever a public antitrust
action is filed, the executive branch first determines whether
United States' interests with regard to anticompetitive conduct
outweighs those of foreign nations.' As to private antitrust suits,
however, the executive branch does not have this same
opportunity to determine whether the impact on foreign relations
outweighs the benefits sought by a private party. 45 Therefore, the
risk that a judicial decision may disturb United States' foreign
policy is greater when litigating a private antitrust suit than when
litigating a public one.146
2.

ConstitutionalProtections

Defendants violating antitrust laws may face either civil or
criminal prosecutions. 17 It is only criminal antitrust prosecutions,
Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976) (considering the interference
an exercise of jurisdiction may have on the foreign affairs of the relevant
nations); see also supra notes 68, 74 and accompanying text.
143. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1292.
144. Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 8, at S-22 n.167. The DOJ's view is
that the Judicial branch should not dismiss any government action on the
basis of comity because the DOJ, and therefore the executive branch, will have
already considered those factors before any suit is filed. Id. When balancing
the United States' interests with those of a foreign nation, the DOJ considers
many factors, including:
(1) the relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct within
the United States as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States
consumers or competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the
conduct on the United States as compared to the effects abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or
defeated by the action; and
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic
policies.
Id. at S-22 to S-23 n.170.
145. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
146. See Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 8, at S-22 n.167 (describing
private antitrust actions as risky in that a finding of liability may disturb a
foreign nation's political objectives and impinge upon the executive
department's role in foreign affairs). The courts have even suggested that
courts should bar private antitrust suits with extraterritorial affect due to the
risk they pose to foreign affairs. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613 n.28.
147. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act make it a felony to "make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared illegal ...
[or to] monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ... any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States . . ." respectively. Sherman Act §§ 1, 2.
Section 4 of the Sherman Act and sections 4, 4c, and 15 of the Clayton Act
provide for civil remedies based on violations of the Sherman Act. Sherman
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however,

that

constitutional

entitle

a

protections. 148

defendant
The

to

most

several
important

important
of

these

protections are: the right to a trial by jury; the right to counsel;
and Due Process requirements of the presumption of innocence
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. " 9 Importantly, antitrust
laws enable citizens to bring civil suits that ultimately punish the
defendant for the same conduct the government can pursue
criminally, without providing
the defendant
with key
constitutional protections the defendant would otherwise be
entitled to."0°
C. The Absence of ExtraterritorialCriminalAntitrust Actions
laws

Given that courts have held that United States' antitrust
have extraterritorial jurisdictional reach,'
a natural

Act § 4; Clayton Act §§ 4, 4c, 15.
148. The following are Constitutional Amendments granting certain
protections to United States citizens:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
149. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (demanding due process of law in "any
criminal case"); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting the right to trial by jury and
counsel in "all criminal prosecutions"). Courts have determined that the due
process requirement that the prosecutor must prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt applies only to criminal cases. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 4748 (1914).
150. See supra notes 120-21, 148 and accompanying text.
151. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir.
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 610 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir.
1945).
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question is why the United States has waited until the mid-1990's
to bring a criminal antitrust prosecution based on wholly
extraterritorial conduct." 2 Several factors have impeded the DOJ's
ability to effectively enforce its role in bringing criminal suits
involving extraterritorial conduct. Part one will discuss those
factors while part two will discuss what is being done to overcome
those barriers.
1. Barriersto CriminalEnforcement of Conduct with
ExtraterritorialRepercussions

At the end of 1994, the DOJ had thirty percent fewer
attorneys than in 1980; approximating the number of attorneys
the DOJ had in 1972.' The DOJ reduced the number of attorneys
Today,
it employed at the same time the economy was booming.'
to
pursue
resources
has
fewer
DOJ
the
attorneys,
with fewer
criminal prosecutions; and with an increasingly global economy,
the DOJ faces a tremendous amount of pressure.'55
In addition to lacking resources to effectively pursue
have7
extraterritorial criminal conduct, foreign governments
6
clawback1
and
blocking'
enacting
by
DOJ
the
hindered
statutes. 58 These statutes delay, if not prevent, much of the
discovery necessary to bring successful criminal prosecutions.' 9
Even in those nations without such statutes in effect, the DOJ has
encountered negative reactions to requests for information

152. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997)
(noting that this case represents the first criminal prosecution based on wholly
extraterritorial conduct).
153. 1994 ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANN. REP. i,

available in 1995 WL 33161 (D.O.J.) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
154. Id. The DOJ has released figures putting the economy at two and a half
times the size it was about 20 years before. Anne K. Bingaman, The Clinton
Administration: Trends in Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, Address Before
the Corporate Counsel Institute (Nov. 30, 1995), available in 1995 WL 710992
(D.O.J.), at *1.
155. Bingaman, supra note 154, at *1.
156. Legislatures enact blocking statutes to prevent the citizens of a foreign
nation from providing information helpful to antitrust investigations. Roscoe
B. Starek, III, InternationalAspects of Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks Before
the Seminar on Antitrust for the 90s the Second Century of Change (July 15,
1994), available in 1994 WL 642420 (F.T.C.), at *2.
157. Clawback statutes provide a defendant found liable in a treble damage
action to recover from the successful plaintiff any uncompensable amounts
awarded. Id.
158. Canada, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, and Switzerland have
all enacted this type of legislation. Id. at *11 n.4.
159. H.R. REP. No. 103-772, at 11 (1994), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1994,

Pub. L. No. 103-438, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat. 4597) 3647, at 3651
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
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regarding criminal investigations.160 This may be because these
nations view16 such criminal prosecutions as an insult to their
sovereignty. 1
2. Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act
In order to assist in the government's efforts to collect
information from abroad for antitrust investigations, Congress
enacted the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of
1994.162
This Act authorizes the government to provide
information to foreign officials conducting their own antitrust
investigations, and further authorizes the government to
investigate American firms for foreign officials; provided these
foreign governments reciprocate when the United States needs
information from them.6 8 This Act also mandates that foreign
officials use the information our government provides only for law
enforcement purposes.
The Act thus gives the government of the
United States an opportunity to establish
working relationships
1 65
with foreign officials in the antitrust field.
III.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO THEIR FULLEST
EXTENT

Congress charged the executive branch
United States' antitrust laws to their
concern for where the conduct occurs,
unreasonably restrains United States'

with the duty to enforce
"fullest extent," without
whenever that conduct
commerce.166
To help

160. Starek, supra note 156, at *3.
161. Id. at *5.

162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212 (1994).
163. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 159, at 3647-48.
164. Id. at 3648.
Much of the information in the United States
Government's possession is confidential, as is most information necessary for
effective antitrust enforcement in the possession of foreign governments. Id.
at 3653. By reaching agreements with foreign nations under the Act, antitrust
officials can share this information between nations as long as the foreign
nations meet certain confidentiality requirements. Id. at 3654.
165. The Government has cultivated such agreements with the European
Union, Australia, and Germany.

Id. at 3652; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note

153, at 2; Starek, supra note 156, at *11 n.6. The agreement with Australia,
for instance, cancels out their blocking statute when the United States notifies
the Australian Government of it needs in the manner the agreement provides.
Starek, supra note 156, at *11 n.23. The United States has also joined with
Canada in the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which the DOJ used to help
penetrate the fax paper price fixing scheme at the heart of Nippon Paper.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 159, at 3652; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note

153, at 1.
166. Bingaman, supra note 154, at *2. Congress established the Sherman
Act's extraterritorial reach in the Act itself which Congress reinforced through
the enactment of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982. Id.
See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994)
(reinforcing the Sherman Act's extraterritorial reach by providing conditions
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enforce the antitrust laws, Congress provided prosecutors with the
alternative of bringing either criminal prosecutions or civil suits." 7
Congress intended the civil and criminal actions to function in a
parallel manner." 8 To insure the parallelism of the two types of
actions, Congress provided plaintiffs in civil actions with the right
to recover treble damages.169 In addition, the courts have made
prosecutions easier by removing the obstacle of several common
law defenses.17 ° This possibility of treble damages and the absence
of several common law defenses gives civil actions a penal nature.
Whether a successful action will result in treble damages, fines, or
imprisonment, all function as both a deterrent and a punishment.
Courts have consistently upheld the enforcement of Congress'
mandate to enforce the antitrust laws to their fullest extent with
regard to civil antitrust actions based on extraterritorial
conduct. 17 ' However, the DOJ has not enforced the antitrust laws
to their fullest extent in regard to criminal prosecutions. In 1997,
the First Circuit decided a previously unanswered question:
whether the government can predicate a criminal antitrust action
on wholly extraterritorial anticompetitive conduct.1 72 Until this
time, the DOJ neglected to enforce antitrust laws with regard to
criminal conduct committed abroad. This Comment proposes that
the government can base criminal antitrust actions on wholly
extraterritorial conduct and argues that the government needs to
provide the DOJ with more resources and implement enforcement
agreements with foreign nations in order to make effective
enforcement possible.
Prosecutors have utilized civil actions to enforce antitrust
laws, enabling the government to expand its resources and to rid
itself of the constitutional burdens to which defendants are

for when the courts can exercise its jurisdiction). See supra notes 100 and 101
and accompanying text for a discussion on Congress' power to regulate trade

with foreign nations. The Supreme Court confirmed the Act's extraterritorial
jurisdiction in Hartford Fire by holding that the Act regulates even
extraterritorial conduct when it is meant to produce, and does produce, an

effect on United States' commerce. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S.
764, 796 (1993).
167. See supra Part I.A. for a discussion on which parties may bring civil

and criminal actions under the antitrust laws.
168. See supra Part II.A. and II.A.1. for a discussion of the parallelism
between civil and criminal antitrust actions.
169. See supra Part II.A.2.a. for a discussion on the use of treble damages as
a stimulus for individuals to bring suits, and as a punishment for those who

violate the antitrust laws.
170. See supra Part II.A.2.b. for a discussion on the common law doctrines
the courts have waived as defenses for antitrust defendants.
171. See supra Part I.B. for a discussion on how it became settled law that
the Sherman Act's jurisdiction extends to reach conduct committed abroad.
172. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997).
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entitled in criminal trials. 73 The government has been prosecuting
defendants through the parallel civil action provided by Congress
in the same statutory language in which Congress provided for
criminal prosecutions. *At the same time, individuals acting as
private attorneys general have brought suits under the Clayton
Act, which authorizes suits for treble damages against Sherman
Act violators. Allowing the government to bring criminal suits
against foreign defendants for anticompetitive conduct committed
abroad would actually provide defendants with greater protections
than those they receive under the current policy.
Foreign trade makes up approximately twenty-five percent of
the United States' gross domestic product, more than double what
it was thirty years ago.
In 1994, the DOJ had roughly the same
number of attorneys as it had thirty years ago.17' Thus, the
activity the DOJ is responsible for policing has multiplied as the
DOJ has been diminishing in power and strength.
Congress intended for the antitrust laws to be enforced to
their fullest extent. To accomplish this, the government must
utilize all the weapons that these antitrust laws provide. This
means that violators who have committed criminal acts should
face criminal penalties. The first step toward effectively enforcing
the antitrust laws to their fullest extent is to increase the DOJ's
staff. The increase in the number of fines the DOJ will be able to
secure through successful prosecutions of anticompetitive conduct
committed abroad will help offset the cost of the increased
manpower.
The second step toward effectively enforcing our Nation's
antitrust laws to their fullest extent is to utilize agreements with
foreign nations consistent with the provisions of the International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act. 7 6 The United States has
entered into antitrust cooperation agreements with Australia,
Canada, Germany and the European Union. 177 However, as of
November, 1995, the agreement with Canada was the only one
that the DOJ had utilized in an antitrust investigation regarding
extraterritorial conduct. 178 Our government must actively pursue
nations interested in entering these agreements and exercise its
rights under the agreements once made.

173. The treble damage award in civil actions has enabled the government to
use private citizens as private attorneys general to prosecute defendants.
174. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 159, at 3651.
175. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 153, at i.

176. See supra Part II.C.2. for a discussion of the International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994.
177. Bingaman, supra note 154, at *10.

178. Id.
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CONCLUSION

With the increasing significance of import and export trade on
United States commerce, the DOJ cannot limit its criminal
enforcement of the United States antitrust laws to domestic
issues. The DOJ has restricted criminal prosecutions to conduct
that is inherently illegal such as price fixing, market allocation,
and bid rigging. These activities deny Americans their right to a
free market economy by artificially raising prices and reducing the
quality and quantity of goods.'79 Our Nation's courts should not
allow businesses to get away with this type of activity merely
because they committed their acts in a foreign country.
Congress has made clear that it wants antitrust laws enforced
to their fullest extent. It has been over fifty years since the courts
first stated that it was settled law that antitrust laws have
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 8 " The courts have consistently held
that plaintiffs can base civil actions on conduct committed wholly
abroad. It is time to effectuate Congress' intent and to promote
the parallelism between the two types of actions by granting
extraterritorial jurisdiction over conduct committed wholly abroad
in criminal prosecutions.

179. Bingaman, supra note 154, at *3.
180. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d
Cir. 1945) (holding that it is settled law that states can restrict conduct that
has an effect within its territory).

